

# Individual Preferences on Migrants: A Story of Citizenship

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**Abstract:** *This paper argues that citizenship law has a fundamental effect on shaping public attitude toward immigrants. By dividing this law into jus soli (principle by birthplace) and jus sanguinis (principle by blood), I hypothesize that natives, who have a long history of exposure to immigrants with equal rights (in this case, jus soli), will be more willing to grant greater rights to immigrants. To demonstrate this, I use Eurobarometer 76.4 (2011) for empirical analysis. In addition, I rely on both increased rate of immigrant stock and inflow in order to capture how differently people in the two different citizenship laws view immigrants when they see an increase.*

**Keywords:** *citizenship law, anti-migration sentiment, survey data*

## 1. Introduction

The topic of citizenship law has received a great attention since the 1980s due to a growing number of migrants [1]. Since it is a fundamental way to distinguish natives from the “others,” its connection to group threat psychology has been widely studied by scholars [1][2][3]. By applying intergroup contact hypothesis [4], which shows intergroup contact will lead to a favourable attitude toward initial out-group members due to decreasing prejudice and increasing familiarity, I argue; *Natives in jus soli law will be more willing to grant greater rights for immigrants.*

## 2. Hypothesis

Acquisition of a country’s citizenship means a full membership of the community with a guarantee of civil, political and social rights [5]. To classify citizenship law, scholars have traditionally used dichotomous distinctions – *jus soli* (law of birthplace) and *jus sanguinis* (law of blood). If a child is born under immigrant parents, he/she will automatically obtain nationality of the host country even without the parents being the nationals, if the country’s citizenship law is *jus soli*. On the other hand, if the host country’s nationality law follows *jus sanguinis*, he/she will not be able to acquire the country’s nationality, because he/she is not connected by ancestry. This distinction has been widely used to understand countries’ dissimilar characteristics.

The intergroup contact hypothesis has been widely examined and supported by many scholars [6]-[10]. Conversely, many claim that frequent contact among different groups will produce a greater conflict (intergroup hostility hypothesis) [11][12][13]. What this debate alludes is that depending on certain conditions, a growing number of contact among in-group and out-group members may bring about an opposite effects. The largest distinction between *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* regimes is that natives in the former regime recognize migrants can obtain the same status as theirs, and they are frequently exposed to such a situation where they are surrounded by those immigrants with equal rights. On the other, natives under the latter regime are not used to such an environment, and thus, their conception on citizenship continues to be strongly based on blood or ancestry. They may feel closer to “overall” migrants as a stock of foreign population grows. However, they would not feel motivated to share the same rights with migrants. Thus, intergroup contact hypothesis would function more efficiently in *jus soli* countries.

## 3. Data, Measurement and Model Specification

To assess my hypotheses on public attitude toward migrants, I use Eurobarometer 76.4 [14], which was conducted in December 2011. There are two questionnaires that specifically ask in regards to immigrants: one on economic and cultural view on immigration and the other on immigrant rights. Also, I use a questionnaire on

difficulty in bill payment (d60) as a proxy to measure income level. For citizenship law, I have updated Fitzgerald, Leblang, and Teets' (2014) dataset [15]. The classification of countries is listed in Table 1. Further variables along with specific details are shown in Table 2. For stock and inflow of immigrants, I use UN and OECD datasets [16][17] for the years of 2005 and 2010. From these years, I calculate increased or decreased rate (%) to gauge how they influence public attitude in the following year.

The values of the two dependent variables are ordered categorical, and thus, I use ordered logistic regression model with country fixed effects. Here, citizenship law, stock, and inflow only vary across countries, and thus, these effects will drop out if I directly apply them into my model. Thus, I include them as an interaction term with income variable.

TABLE I: Countries by Their Citizenship Law

<i>Jus soli</i> rule	<i>Jus sanguinis</i> rule
Germany, France, Ireland, UK	Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovakia

TABLE II: Summary of Variables

Variables	Description on Questionnaires and Coding
<b>Dependent Variables</b>	
Attitude	(qb9_1) Immigration enriches (country's) economy and culture: Totally agree (1) Tend to agree (2) Tend to disagree (3) Totally disagree (4) (qb9_2) Legal immigrants should have the same rights as [country's] citizens: Totally agree (1) Tend to agree (2) Tend to disagree (3) Totally disagree (4)
<b>Independent Variables</b>	
Citizenship	Citizenship regime (Binary): 1 if <i>jus soli</i> , and 0 if <i>jus sanguinis</i> [Source: updated Fitzgerald, Leblang and Teets (2014)]
Stock	Increased rate of Immigrant stock from 2005 to 2010 (%) [Source: compiled based on UN Population Division]
Inflow	Increased Rate of Inflow of Immigrants from 2005 to 2010 (%) [Source: compiled based on OECD Migration Dataset]
Education	(d8r2: Recoded) How old were you when you stopped full-time education? No formal education (1) Up to 15 (2) 16~19 (3) above 20 (4)
Income	(d60) During the last 12 months, would you say you had difficulties to pay your bills at the end of the month? Most of the time (1) From time to time (2) Almost never/ Never (3)
<b>Control Variables</b>	
Nationalism	(qa1_1) You are happy living in [country]: Totally agree (1) Tend to agree (2) Tend to disagree (3) Totally disagree (4)
View on EU	(qa1_2) You are happy living in the EU: Totally agree (1) Tend to agree (2) Tend to disagree (3) Totally disagree (4)
Unemployed	(d15a_r1: Recoded): 1 if unemployed, 0 otherwise
Married	(d7: Recoded) Binary: 1 if married, 0 if not
Gender	(d10) Binary: 1 if male, 0 if female
Age	(d11r2) 15~24 (1) 25~39 (2) 40~54 (3) 55~64 (4) 65~74 (5) 75+ (6)
Rural	(d25) Would you say you live in a: Rural area or village (1) Small or middle sized town (2) Large town (3) Don't know (4)

Notes: Original variables in parentheses. Responses, "refused," "don't know," or "not applicable," are deleted.

## 4. Results

Table III reports overall results. In regards to citizenship law variable (model 2), a coefficient of income variable alone shows its effect when citizenship law is 0 (*jus sanguinis*), while a summation of this coefficient and that of interaction term represents income's effect when citizenship law is 1 (*jus soli*). In order to more directly observe effects of stock and flow in each citizenship law, I further disaggregate the dataset between *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* countries (Table IV and V). Still, it is difficult to deduce any meaningful findings from

these results, because it is questionable what the effect of income infers here, and furthermore, it is problematic to interpret interaction terms with continuous variables (stock and inflow). Thus, I turn to marginal effects in the next section.

TABLE III: Ordered Logit Regression with Country-Fixed Effects

	Overall Images on Immigrants					Views on Immigrant Rights				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Citizenship x Income		-.154** (.051)			-.178** (.053)		-.099# (.051)			-.091# (.053)
Stock x Income			-.000 (.001)		-.001 (.001)			-.000 (.001)		.000 (.001)
Inflow x Income				-.001 (.001)	-.001* (.001)				.001 (.001)	.000 (.001)
Education	-.284*** (.021)	-.285*** (.021)	-.284*** (.021)	-.285*** (.021)	-.286*** (.021)	-.187*** (.021)	-.188*** (.021)	-.187*** (.021)	-.186*** (.021)	-.187*** (.021)
Income	-.020 (.023)	.020 (.027)	-.017 (.031)	-.013 (.024)	.049 (.036)	-.054* (.023)	-.029 (.027)	-.051# (.031)	-.060* (.024)	-.036 (.036)
Nationalism	-.103*** (.023)	-.103*** (.023)	-.103*** (.023)	-.102*** (.023)	-.102*** (.023)	-.019 (.023)	-.019 (.023)	-.019 (.023)	-.019 (.023)	-.020 (.023)
View on EU	.474*** (.020)	.475*** (.020)	.474*** (.020)	.474*** (.020)	.475*** (.020)	.323*** (.020)	.323*** (.020)	.323*** (.020)	.323*** (.020)	.323*** (.020)
Unemployed	.045 (.030)	.044 (.030)	.045 (.030)	.045 (.030)	.044 (.030)	-.011 (.030)	-.012 (.030)	-.011 (.030)	-.012 (.030)	-.012 (.030)
Married	-.065* (.029)	-.064* (.029)	-.065* (.029)	-.064* (.029)	-.062* (.029)	-.062* (.029)	-.061* (.029)	-.062* (.029)	-.063* (.029)	-.062* (.029)
Gender	.035 (.028)	.036 (.028)	.035 (.028)	.035 (.028)	.035 (.028)	.005 (.028)	.005 (.028)	.005 (.028)	.005 (.028)	.005 (.028)
Age	.034*** (.009)	.035*** (.009)	.034*** (.009)	.034*** (.009)	.036*** (.009)	.058*** (.009)	.059*** (.009)	.058*** (.009)	.058*** (.009)	.059*** (.009)
Rural	-.070*** (.018)	-.071*** (.018)	-.070*** (.018)	-.070*** (.018)	-.071*** (.018)	-.085*** (.018)	-.086*** (.018)	-.085*** (.018)	-.085*** (.018)	-.086*** (.018)
Observation	18,304	18,304	18,304	18,304	18,304	18,483	18,483	18,483	18,483	18,483
Log Likelihood	- 22630.5	- 22626.0	- 22630.5	- 22629.5	- 22623.6	- 22229.9	-22228.1	- 22229.9	-22229.3	- 22227.8

\*\*\*p < 0.001, \*\*p < 0.01, \*p < 0.05, #p < 0.01; standard errors in parentheses.

TABLE IV: Ordered Logit Regression with Country-Fixed Effects in *jus soli* countries

	Overall Images on Immigrants					Views on Immigrant Rights				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Income x Stock		-.010** (.003)	.003 (.002)		.016 (.017)		-.010** (.003)	-.002 (.002)		-.011 (.017)
Income x Inflow		-.007** (.002)		-.001 (.001)	.007 (.009)		-.004# (.002)		.001 (.001)	-.005 (.009)
Education	-.461*** (.044)		-.461*** (.044)	-.461*** (.044)	-.460*** (.044)	-.339*** (.043)		-.339*** (.043)	-.339*** (.043)	-.339*** (.043)
Income	-.098* (.046)		-.145* (.060)	-.105* (.047)	-.313 (.231)	-.090* (.045)		-.055 (.058)	-.085# (.046)	.064 (.228)
Nationalism	.025 (.048)		.025 (.048)	.025 (.048)	.025 (.048)	.047 (.048)		.047 (.048)	.047 (.048)	.046 (.048)
View on EU	.509*** (.038)		.509*** (.038)	.510*** (.038)	.508*** (.039)	.364*** (.038)		.365*** (.038)	.364*** (.038)	.366*** (.038)
Unemployed	-.006 (.062)		-.004 (.062)	-.005 (.062)	-.003 (.062)	-.067 (.061)		-.070 (.061)	-.069 (.061)	-.071 (.061)
Married	.004 (.059)		.005 (.059)	.005 (.059)	.006 (.059)	-.063 (.059)		-.065 (.059)	-.064 (.059)	-.065 (.059)
Gender	.201*** (.056)		.200*** (.056)	.200*** (.056)	.200*** (.056)	.071 (.056)		.071 (.056)	.071 (.056)	.071 (.056)
Age	.017 (.020)		.017 (.020)	.017 (.020)	.017 (.020)	.038* (.020)		.039* (.020)	.039* (.020)	.039* (.020)
Rural	-.201*** (.038)		-.199*** (.038)	-.200*** (.038)	-.199*** (.038)	-.160*** (.037)		-.162*** (.037)	-.161*** (.037)	-.162*** (.037)
Observation	4,345	4,594	4,345	4,345	4,345	4,380	4,638	4,380	4,380	4,380
Log Likelihood	-5419.6	-5994.2	-5418.8	-5418.9	-5418.5	-5558.2	-6038.5	-5557.8	-5557.9	-5557.6

TABLE V: Ordered Logit Regression with Country-Fixed Effects in *jus sanguinis* countries

	Overall Images on Immigrants					Views on Immigrant Rights				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Income x Stock		-.005*** (.001)	-.002 (.002)		-.002 (.002)		-.005*** (.001)	.001 (.002)		.001 (.002)
Income x Inflow		-.000 (.001)		-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)		.000 (.001)		.000 (.001)	.000 (.001)
Education	-.231*** (.025)		-.230*** (.025)	-.231*** (.025)	-.231*** (.025)	-.133*** (.025)		-.133*** (.025)	-.133*** (.025)	-.133*** (.025)
Income	.000 (.027)		.029 (.037)	.016 (.029)	.042 (.037)	-.047# (.027)		-.061# (.037)	-.051# (.029)	-.064# (.038)
Nationalism	-.138*** (.027)		-.137*** (.027)	-.138*** (.027)	-.137*** (.027)	-.036 (.027)		-.036 (.027)	-.036 (.027)	-.036 (.027)
View on EU	.458*** (.023)		.457*** (.023)	.458*** (.023)	.458*** (.023)	.302*** (.023)		.302*** (.023)	.302*** (.023)	.302*** (.023)

Unemployed	.057 <sup>#</sup>	.057 <sup>#</sup>	.057 <sup>#</sup>	.057 <sup>#</sup>	.008	.008	.008	.008
	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)	(.035)	(.035)	(.035)	(.035)
Married	-.081 <sup>*</sup>	-.081 <sup>*</sup>	-.079 <sup>*</sup>	-.080 <sup>*</sup>	-.053	-.053	-.054	-.054
	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)	(.034)
Gender	-.017	-.018	-.017	-.018	-.016	-.015	-.016	-.015
	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)	(.032)
Age	.040 <sup>***</sup>	.040 <sup>***</sup>	.040 <sup>***</sup>	.040 <sup>***</sup>	.064 <sup>***</sup>	.064 <sup>***</sup>	.064 <sup>***</sup>	.064 <sup>***</sup>
	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)	(.011)
Rural	-.032	-.032	-.032	-.033	-.063 <sup>**</sup>	-.063 <sup>**</sup>	-.063 <sup>**</sup>	-.063 <sup>**</sup>
	(.021)	(.021)	(.021)	(.021)	(.021)	(.021)	(.021)	(.021)
Observation	13,959	14,769	13,959	13,959	14,103	14,950	14,103	14,103
Log Likelihood	-17159.7	-18528.6	-17159.0	-17158.4	-16614.1	-17897.0	-16614.0	-16613.9

## 5. Interpretation

Figure I shows marginal effects of citizenship law based on results from Table III. The horizontal axis represents a probability that people become anti-immigrant. When a dependent variable is on overall feelings toward immigrants (from both economic and cultural standpoints), people in *jus sanguinis* law would dislike immigrants by .178 while those in *jus soli* law would by .127 with significance level at 0.1 per cent. When the dependent variable is on immigrant rights, those in *jus sanguinis* law would dislike immigrants by .124 while those in *jus soli* law would by .103 at the same significance level. Overall, it seems that those in *jus sanguinis* countries tend to be more anti-immigrant, although the difference seems to be rather small, especially in regards to immigrant rights. Still, citizenship law brings about 5 per cent difference on overall perception on immigrants. In order to examine more specifically on how stock and inflow intervene in formation of public attitude, I generate marginal effects based on Table IV and V.

Fig. I: Marginal Effects of Citizenship Law




Fig. II: Marginal Effects of Stock and Inflow in *jus soli* countries





Figure II and III report marginal effects of stock and inflow when they are intervened with income levels of individuals. This is because previous literatures predict that people would be more anti-immigrants when they experience economic difficulties. The second figure depicts marginal effects in *jus soli* countries. In regards to overall image on immigrants, it can be interpreted that both low- and high-income earners become more hostile against immigrants as they witness increase in immigrant stock. Interestingly, this effect is higher among higher income earners. On the other, both groups of individuals tend to reveal relaxed view on immigrant rights to the similar degree (almost converging into the effect of zero), even when they see increased stock. The similar trends appear vis-à-vis migrant inflows. Again, both high- and low-income earners reveal a more negative overall image against immigrants as immigrant inflow increases. In the meantime, however, increased rate of inflow does not seem to affect the way people view migrant rights. The tentative conclusion here is that both stock and inflow induce negative overall image against immigrants while this negative effect does not spill over to immigrant rights.

Figure III shows marginal effects of stock and inflow in *jus sanguinis* countries. Compared to trends observed in *jus soli* countries, those in *jus sanguinis* law appear to be opposite. In regards to both increased rate of immigrant stock and inflow, both high- and low-income earners tend to possess less hostile attitude toward overall image on immigrants. On the other hand, their hostility against immigrant rights increases as either immigrant stock or inflow surges. The implication here is that increased volume of immigrant stock or inflow does not induce overall negative image toward immigrants while people tend to prefer limited rights granted for immigrants. Overall, people in *jus soli* countries may impose a negative image against immigrants as they

witness growing number of immigrants in their territories. However, this does not mean they would like to constraint rights granted for immigrants. On the other, people in *jus sanguinis* countries may not directly reveal negative image against immigrant, although their willingness to share the same rights would not emerge.

Fig. III: Marginal Effects of Stock and Inflow in *jus sanguinis* countries



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